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It is known that there is a sound and faithful translation of the full
intuitionistic propositional calculus into the atomic polymorphic system
Fat, a predicative calculus with only two connectives: the conditional and
the second-order universal quantifier. The faithfulness of the embedding
was established quite recently via a model-theoretic argument based in
Kripke structures. In this paper we present a purely proof-theoretic proof
of faithfulness. As an application, we give a purely proof-theoretic proof of
the disjunction property of the intuitionistic propositional logic in which
commuting conversions are not needed.
1 Introduction
A propositional formula is a formula built from a stock of propositional letters
(or constants) P , Q, R, etc using the propositional connectives ⊥, ∧, ∨ and →.
In [6], Prawitz defined the following translation:
(P )? :≡ P , with P a propositional constant
(⊥)? :≡ ∀X.X
(A→ B)? :≡ A? → B?
(A ∧B)? :≡ ∀X((A? → (B? → X))→ X)
(A ∨B)? :≡ ∀X((A? → X)→ ((B? → X)→ X)),
where X is a second-order propositional variable which does not occur in A? or
B?. The target language is the language of Girard’s (polymorphic) system F (cf.
[5]). It consists of the smallest class of expressions which includes the atomic
formulas (propositional constants P , Q, R, . . . and second-order propositional
variables X, Y , Z, . . .) and is closed under implication and second-order uni-
versal quantification. Note that the translation A? of a propositional formula A
is, clearly, a formula without second-order free variables. Prawitz’s translation
is actually an embedding of the propositional intuitionistic calculus into system
F in the sense that if `i A then `F A? (here `i denotes provability in the
intuitionistic propositional calculus and `F denotes provability in the system
F).
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In 2006, the first author noticed (cf. [1]) that the above embedding still
works if the target system F is restricted to a predicative system nowadays
known as Fat (an acronym for atomic polymorphism). The atomic polymorphic
system Fat has the same formulas as F, but replaces the second-order universal
elimination rule by a predicative variant. For definiteness, we describe the











where the notation 〈A〉 says that the formula A is being discharged and, in
the universal rule, X does not occur free in any undischarged hypothesis. The















where C is an atomic formula (free for X in A), and A[C/X] is the result of
replacing in A all the free occurrences of X by C. Note that only atomic instan-
tiations are permitted in the ∀E rule. This contrasts with the (impredicative)
system F, where C can be any formula.
The reason why, despite the restriction of the ∀E-rule, the system Fat is still
able to embed full intuitionistic propositional calculus lies in the availability of
instantiation overflow, i.e., for the three types of universal formulas occurring
in Prawitz’s translation, it is possible to derive in Fat the formulas resulting
from instantiations of the second-order variable X by any formula, not only the
atomic ones. For a complete description of instantiation overflow and of the
embedding see [1, 2]. In the former reference, it is also shown that Fat has both
the subformula property (for normal derivations) and an appropriate form of
the disjunction property. (The notion of subformula only needs explanation for
universal formulas. The proper subformulas of a formula of the form ∀X.A[X]
are the subformulas of the formulas of the form A[C/X], for C an atomic formula
free for X in A.) The latter reference is a study on the translation of the
commuting conversions of the intuitionistic propositional calculus into Fat. Note
that, since the connectives ⊥, ∨ and ∃ are absent from Fat, this system has no
commuting conversions. For more on Fat, including a proof that the system is
strongly normalizable for βη-conversions, see [3].
As we have discussed, Prawitz’s translation (·)? gives a sound embedding of
the intuitionistic propositional calculus into Fat, that is: If `i A then `Fat A?.
The translation is also faithful. I.e.:
If `Fat A? then `i A.
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This latter fact was recently proved using a model-theoretic argument in [4].
In the present paper, we give a pure proof-theoretic proof of the faithfulness of
Fat. We believe that this approach is interesting in its own right. Furthermore,
it shows how to obtain a proof-theoretic proof of the disjunction property for
the intuitionistic propositional calculus via natural deduction without the need
of commuting conversions. As we have suggested in previous papers (cf. [2, 3]),
the need for the ad hoc commuting conversions is a reflection of the fact that
we are not considering intuitionistic propositional logic in its proper setting, viz
the wider setting of Fat.
The paper is organized in three sections. After this introduction, Section 2
presents the new proof-theoretic proof of the faithfulness of Fat. The alternative
proof of the disjunction property of the intuitionistic propositional calculus is
presented in Section 3.
2 A proof-theoretic proof of faithfulness
A second-order universal formula which is a subformula of a formula of the
form A? (A a propositional formula) must take one of three forms: ∀X.X,
∀X((C? → (D? → X)) → X) or ∀X((C? → X) → ((D? → X) → X)), with
C and D propositional formulas. Hence, the following definition is in good
standing:
Definition 2.1. Let A be a propositional formula. For B any subformula of
A?, we define a formula B̃ in the language of propositional calculus (⊥, ∧, ∨,→)
extended with second-order variables (but without second-order quantifications)
in the following way:
If B is atomic, then B̃ :≡ B.
If B :≡ C → D, then B̃ :≡ C̃ → D̃.
If B :≡ ∀X.X, then B̃ :≡ ⊥.
If B :≡ ∀X((C? → (D? → X))→ X), then B̃ :≡ C ∧D.
If B :≡ ∀X((C? → X)→ ((D? → X)→ X)), then B̃ :≡ C ∨D.
Note that B and B̃ have the same free variables. Also, when C is a propo-
sitional formula, C̃? is just C.
Lemma 2.2. Let Γ be a tuple of formulas in Fat and A be a formula in Fat
with their free variables among the variables in X̄. If there is a proof (say D)
in Fat of A[X̄] from Γ[X̄] in which all formulas (occurring in D and Γ[X̄]) are
subformulas of formulas of the form D? (D a propositional formula), then
Γ̃[F̄ /X̄] `i Ã[F̄ /X̄]
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for any tuple of propositional formulas F̄ . For Γ[X̄] :≡ A1[X̄], . . . , An[X̄],
Γ̃[F̄ /X̄] denotes the tuple of propositional formulas Ã1[F̄ /X̄], . . . , Ãn[F̄ /X̄].
(Of course, the reading of Ã[F̄ /X̄] is to first consider the transformed formula
Ã and, afterwards, effect the substitution [F̄ /X̄] in it. The alternative reading
does not make sense in general.)
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation D.
If D is a one node proof-tree, then A[X̄] is in Γ[X̄]. The result is trivial since
for any tuple F̄ of propositional formulas we have Ã[F̄ /X̄] `i Ã[F̄ /X̄].







Fix F̄ a tuple of propositional formulas. The aim is to prove that Γ̃[F̄ /X̄] `i
Ã[F̄ /X̄]→ B̃[F̄ /X̄]. According to the induction hypothesis, we have Ã[F̄ /X̄], Γ̃[F̄ /X̄] `i
B̃[F̄ /X̄]. Thus, adding an introduction rule for implication which discharges
Ã[F̄ /X̄], we get the desired result.












Fix F̄ a tuple of propositional formulas. By induction hypothesis, we have
both Γ̃[F̄ /X̄] `i Ã[F̄ /X̄] and Γ̃[F̄ /X̄] `i Ã[F̄ /X̄] → B̃[F̄ /X̄]. Applying the
elimination rule for implication, we get Γ̃[F̄ /X̄] `i B̃[F̄ /X̄].







Since ∀X.A[Ȳ , X] is a subformula of a translated formula D?, with D a
propositional formula, we know that only three cases may occur: (i) A is X;
(ii) A has the form (C? → (E? → X)) → X or (iii) A has the form (C? →
X) → ((E? → X) → X) with C and E propositional formulas. In any of the
cases, the only free variable in A is X. So, in the scheme above, A[Ȳ , X] and
∀X.A[Ȳ , X] may be replaced by A[X] and ∀X.A[X] respectively.
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In case (i), fix F̄ a tuple of propositional formulas and let us prove that
Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i ⊥. By induction hypothesis we know that Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i X[G/X] for
every propositional formula G. Just take G as being ⊥.
In case (ii), we need to prove that Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i C ∧ E, for every tuple F̄
of propositional formulas. Fix F̄ . By induction hypothesis, we know that
Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i Ã[G/X] for any propositional formula G. In particular, for G :≡
C ∧ E, we have
Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i (C → (E → C ∧ E))→ C ∧ E.
Thus, in the natural deduction calculus for the intuitionistic propositional
calculus, we have the following proof
〈C〉 〈E〉
C ∧ E
E → C ∧ E





(C → (E → C ∧ E))→ C ∧ E
C ∧ E
Therefore, Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i C ∧ E.
In case (iii), we need to prove that Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i C ∨ E, for every tuple F̄
of propositional formulas. Fix F̄ . By induction hypothesis, we know that
Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i Ã[G/X], for any propositional formula G. In particular, for G :≡
C ∨ E, we have
Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i (C → C ∨ E)→ ((E → C ∨ E)→ C ∨ E).
Thus, in the intuitionistic propositional calculus, we have the following proof
〈C〉
C ∨ E





(C → C ∨ E) → ((E → C ∨ E) → C ∨ E)
(E → C ∨ E) → C ∨ E
〈E〉
C ∨ E
E → C ∨ E
C ∨ E
Therefore, Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i C ∨ E.








with C an atomic formula in Fat, i.e., C is a propositional constant or a second-
order variable. We assume w.l.o.g that if C is a second-order variable then C is
among the variables Ȳ , say Yi.
By hypothesis, since ∀X.A[X, Ȳ ] is a subformula of a translated formula,
we know that this formula falls into one of the following three cases: (i) it is
the translation of ⊥; (ii) it is the translation of a conjunction; or (iii) it is the
translation of a disjunction. Moreover, ∀X.A[X, Ȳ ] has no free variables and
so, in the scheme above we can replace ∀X.A[X, Ȳ ] and A[C/X, Ȳ ] by ∀X.A[X]
and A[C/X], respectively.







and we want to prove that Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i C[Fi/Yi], for any tuple F̄ of propositional
formulas. By Fi we denote the formula of the tuple F̄ which instantiates Yi in
Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ].
Fix F̄ . By induction hypothesis we know that Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i ⊥. As a conse-







Hence, Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i C[Fi/Yi].





∀X((H? → (E? → X))→ X)
(H? → (E? → C))→ C
We want to prove that Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i (H → (E → C[Fi/Yi])) → C[Fi/Yi], for
any tuple F̄ of propositional formulas. Fix F̄ . By induction hypothesis we know
that Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i H ∧ E. Thus, we have the following proof in the intuitionistic
propositional calculus
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(H → (E → C[Fi/Yi]))→ C[Fi/Yi]
This is what we want.





∀X((H? → X)→ ((E? → X)→ X))
(H? → C)→ ((E? → C)→ C)
Given any tuple F̄ of propositional formulas, the aim is to show that Γ̃[F̄ /Ȳ ] `i
(H → C[Fi/Yi]) → ((E → C[Fi/Yi]) → C[Fi/Yi]). Fix F̄ . By induction hy-







〈H → C[Fi/Yi]〉 〈H〉
C[Fi/Yi]
〈E → C[Fi/Yi]〉 〈E〉
C[Fi/Yi]
C[Fi/Yi]
(E → C[Fi/Yi])→ C[Fi/Yi]
(H → C[Fi/Yi])→ ((E → C[Fi/Yi])→ C[Fi/Yi])
We are done.
Theorem 2.3 (Faithfulness). Let Γ :≡ A1, . . . , An and A be propositional for-
mulas and consider their translations Γ? :≡ A?1, . . . , A?n and A? into Fat.
If Γ? `Fat A? then Γ `i A.
Proof. Suppose that Γ? `Fat A?. Since Fat has the normalization property (see
[3]), we know that there is a proof, say D, in normal form of A? with premises
Γ?. By the subformula property (see [1], page 5), all formulas that occur in D
are subformulas of A? or are subformulas of formulas in Γ?. Therefore, we are in
the conditions of application of Lemma 2.2. Applying such lemma, we conclude
that Γ̃? `i Ã?, i.e., Γ `i A.
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3 Application
An advantage of having a sound and faithful embedding between two systems is
the possibility to transfer certain results from one system to the other. In this
section, as an application of the (proof-theoretic proof of the) faithfulness of Fat,
we give a new proof of the disjunction property of the intuitionistic propositional
calculus. Note that the usual proof-theoretic proof of the disjunction property
requires the introduction of extra conversions associated with the connectives ⊥
and ∨: the so called commuting conversions or permutative conversions. They
are needed to ensure that a proof in normal form has the subformula property.
The proof-theoretic proof that we present below does not rely on commuting
conversions.
Theorem 3.1. If `i A ∨B then `i A or `i B.
Proof. Suppose that `i A ∨ B. Since the embedding of the full intuitionistic
propositional calculus into Fat is sound, we have `Fat (A ∨ B)?. Applying
the disjunction property of Fat (see [1], pages 5-7), we know that `Fat A? or
`Fat B?. By Theorem 2.3 (faithfulness), we conclude `i A or `i B.
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